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Charles Yablon'
Americans are great lovers of games. We love to play them, to watch
them, to argue about them, and to bet money on them. We use the term
"game" to denote not only trivial and unimportant pastimes, but some of the
most significant events in our personal and professional lives. As Wittgenstein
so playfully pointed out, the term "game" has no fixed and definite meaning.'
It can refer to anything from a ball bouncing against a wall to multimillion
dollar corporate takeovers2 to the most intimate of human relationships.'
Certain games are deeply embedded in American culture and psychology.
American football, for example, is little understood by the rest of the world,
but has acquired a quasi-religious significance in the United States as the ritual
through which we observe some of our most important national holidays.'
Although basketball, by contrast, has achieved worldwide popularity, it was
invented in the United States,5 and American superiority in the sport recently
was demonstrated by the performance of the United States' "Dream Team" in
the Barcelona Olympics and the so-called "Dream Team II" at the 1994 world
basketball championships in Toronto. These teams dominated their opponents
not just on the basketball court, but, more important, in the intense
international competition for lucrative product endorsements.
But one game is more intimately linked to American society and American
self-image than any other. Its rules and strategies are avidly studied by millions
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of Americans. It is the subject of intense media interest. Its most successful
practitioners earn many millions of dollars. The outcome of a single contest
can rivet the attention of whole cities, indeed, the entire nation. It can even
cause riots to break out. It is a pastime Americans indulge in more frequently
than any other people on earth. That game, of course, is litigation.
Americans also watch a lot of baseball.
6
This Essay seeks to analyze the importance of baseball to American legal
theory. This Essay does not discuss the law as it applies to baseball, although
the scholarly law journals are replete with learned analyses of the baseball
exemption to the antitrust laws,7 the rights of free agency under collective
bargaining agreements,8 and even the tort liability of major league baseball to
spectators beaned by hard-hit foul balls.9 It is not even about the infamous
George Brett pine tar incident, in which an umpire's ruling disqualifying a hit
from an overtarred bat was reversed by the President of the American
League,' nor about Justice Blackmun's list of eighty-eight of the most
memorable baseball players, which appeared in the first part of the Supreme
Court's decision in Flood v. Kuhn" (a section that Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White declined to join).
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No, this Essay deals with the contribution of baseball to what is commonly
referred to as jurisprudence or philosophy of law. It seeks to demonstrate how
6. At least, they do between baseball strikes.
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recent advances in American legal theory have been brought about by the
salutary influence of baseball rules and baseball traditions on the thought
processes of legal scholars. I realize the claim is a radical one. Not all legal
scholars are baseball fanatics. I myself am only sort of a fair-weather Mets
fan) 3 But as the contemporary academic world amply demonstrates, lack of
actual knowledge of the subject matter is no impediment to serious scholarly
work.
My thesis is a simple one, so I will attempt to state it with as much
complexity as possible. First, all American lawyers are enmeshed in the
normative boundaries of two incompatible legal systems: the so-called "real"
legal system, which they tediously learn through years of law school, and the
legal system of baseball, which they pick up effortlessly from playgrounds,
sports pages, and television. Second, baseball's legal system is clearly and
demonstrably superior to the real legal system. Third, most of the advances in
American legal theory have come from lawyers trying to figure out why the
real legal system can't be more like baseball.' 4
I will not bother to defend the proposition that Americans are familiar with
the normative structure of baseball. Any American determined not to learn the
fundamentals of baseball would have to make a lifelong effort to avoid all
newspapers, television, playgrounds, and taverns, as well as certain forms of
bubble gum and selected boxes of breakfast cereal. Anyone who chose to
follow this unlikely (but oddly appealing) regimen would still likely wind up
knowing what it means, in the American idiom, to "strike out," "get to first
base," and "play in the big leagues."
The point of this Essay, then, is (1) to show that the normative structure
of baseball is indeed superior to that of law, and (2) to describe how the
attempts of various scholars to deal with that superiority have contributed to
the development of American legal theory.
I. GETTING TO FIRST: THE NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY
OF BASEBALL TO LAW
To begin, we must uncover the hidden history of games and the law.
Lawyers play games. Judges play games. But precisely what game are they
playing? Although the historical record remains obscure, and much of the
relevant evidence has been suppressed, it appears that through much of early
legal history, the game they were playing was dice.
13. That is, I only follow them closely when they are winning. Needless to say, l've had a lot of frec
time during baseball season in recent years-which explains a thing or two about this Essay
14. As the recent baseball strike has shown, when baseball is involved in real legal disputes it turns
out to be just as messy and ambiguous as the rest of modem life. with no clear winners and no one wanting
to cheer for either side.
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Consider that great legal theorist, Frangois Rabelais, recounting the
testimony of Judge Bridlegoose, an innovative sixteenth-century jurist who was
often faced with the problem of conflicting or vague precedents that modern
legal academics have come to characterize as the "indeterminacy of the
law."' 5 Bridlegoose subjected his cases to careful analysis. He quite literally
weighed the pleadings and papers in the case before him. If the papers were
voluminous, and the legal issues accordingly weighty, he resolved them by
rolling his little dice. In simpler cases, with shorter pleadings, he used his big
dice.' 6 Although Bridlegoose's contemporaries questioned some of his
methods, he justified them by pointing out that although his decisions were
frequently appealed, none had ever been reversed. 7
Modern judges, however, have tended to reject the Bridlegoosian approach
with a vehemence that is hard to comprehend. Courts of today occasionally
tolerate dice playing on the part of jurors, but only because the rules of
evidence prohibit any examination of a jury's decisionmaking process."
When judges engage in rolling the dice, however, they are universally
condemned.' 9 The reasons for this rejection of dice playing by judges remain
unclear. After all, the judicial process is supposed to be fair, and nothing is
fairer than a crap game-assuming, of course, that all parties have sufficient
opportunity to inspect the dice.
2°
Why does the prospect of deciding cases by dice make judges so
uncomfortable? Random processes certainly are not unknown to the law. Most
15. I have just mentioned some of those "magic words" that entitle me to put a long footnote here
citing all the articles by me and my friends that deal with legal indeterminacy (and believe me, we've got
plenty of them). My editor tells me, however, that a long footnote here will break up the "flow" of the
Essay. So just write me, and I'll be happy to send you the list myself.
16. FRAN(;OIS RABELAIS, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL 396-409 (J.M. Cohen trans., Penguin Books
1955) (1564).
17. Id. at 408.
18. See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915) (holding that while jurors should not determine
verdict by lot, verdict may not be set aside based on juror's testimony as to her misconduct or that of her
colleagues); Goins v. State, 21 N.E. 476, 482 (Ohio 1889) ("[Ajnd thus it may appear to all the world, by
the subsequent statements of the jurors, that the liberty of a citizen has been gambled away in a jury-room,
yet the court is powerless to interfere, because the policy of the law is-First, to seclude the jury; and,
second, not to allow their evidence to impeach their verdict."); see also FED. R. EVtD. 606(b).
19. See Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 161 F.2d 413, 440 (2d Cir.) ("Ililf
a trial judge who tried a juryless case-although he made special findings of fact which ordinarily, when
supported by substantial evidence, would sustain his decision-were to reveal of record that his actual
decisional process was that of Judge Bridlegoose, no appellate court would hesitate to reverse his
judgment.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947), and cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947);
Knight v. County of Allegheny, 92 A.2d 225, 226 n.* (Pa. 1952) (finding judge's jury instruction reversible
error because it "would seem to approximate the method employed by Rabelais' 'Bridlegoose"').
The only practicing jurist with a good word to say for Judge Bridlegoose was Joseph C. Hutcheson,
who, like other early Legal Realists, had funny ideas about how cases actually got decided. See Joseph C.
Hutcheson, Jr., Lawyer's Law, and the Little, Small Dice, 7 TtL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1932) ("[Tlhe power to
draw in unprovided cases upon the divination of the 'little, small dice' is one of the glory points of the law
which may never be surrendered .... ).
20. But cf FRANK LOESSER Er AL., GUYS AND DOLLS, act 4, sc. 3 (1951), reprinted in Tim GUYS AND
DOLLS BOOK (1982) (describing dice used by "businessman" Big Jule, who "had the spots removed for
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jurisdictions assign judges and jurors to cases at random. In the Southern
District of New York, as in most courts with more than one judge, the judge
assigned to a new case supposedly is determined by a "wheel" that is spun at
the time the new case is filed.2' So far as I know, however, no lawyer or
litigant has ever watched the wheel being spun, or even observed it-a breach
of gambling etiquette that would not be tolerated in even the seediest
22casino.
Of course, randomness in selecting the decisionmaker is unimportant if
decisionmakers are fungible, that is, if all judges will decide like cases alike.
Deciding the case by a roll of the dice, however, reintroduces an element that
lawyers and judges have assiduously sought to banish from the legal process:
the element of luck.
Luck, like spitting and swearing at the judge, is absolutely forbidden in a
court of law.2 3 Litigants do not win because they are lucky. They win because
they are "entitled" to relief. Lawyers do not win because they are lucky. They
win because of their superior acumen and knowledge of the law. Nobody ever
gets lucky in a court of law. Indeed, the very idea of introducing luck seems
destructive to the smooth functioning of the legal system, which purports to be
governed by rational and determinate processes. Yet, as we have seen, judges
do not merely laugh off attempts to reach legal results through gambling or
luck. Nor do they simply dismiss them as misguided efforts of foolish
decisionmakers. They hate them and condemn them, and seek to suppress all
discussion of such activities.24 One cannot help wondering if this is because
almost every judge has, at least in some difficult case, felt the urge to go back
into chambers and roll those little dice just once.
Contrast this stultifying and repressive attitude toward luck with the far
more enlightened approach of baseball. In baseball, luck is permitted, even
encouraged-and so, for that matter, are spitting and swearing at the judge.
Luck is recognized as an essential element of the game, and its distribution
among players and teams is carefully monitored and evaluated. There are hard-
luck pitchers and lucky hits, and various devices designed to maximize the
21. See Steven Brill, When the Government Goes Judge Shopping. Asi LAW . Nov 1988. at 3 (*In
the Southern District, as in all federal court districts with more than one or two judges. cases arc assigned
randomly. When a case is filed at the courthouse in Manhattan's Foley Square. a judge's name is picked.
bingo-style, out of a bowl that spins on a wheel."): see also S.D.N.Y. R. FOR Divisto\ OF BLSt'IESS
AMONG DISTRICT JuDGES 4(b) ("All civil actions ... shall be assigned b) lot within each designated
category to one judge for all purposes.").
22. Cf NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.670 (1994) (authonzing inspection of gaming destecs). NJ RE~v
STAT. § 5:12-79 (1994) (same).
23. In a well-publicized incident in 1982, a tmal judge in Nc%% York chose bctsccn imposing a 20-
or 30-day sentence by publicly flipping a coin while on the bench. He was censured b) a commission of
lawyers and judges and widely condemned by the legal community. See E.R. Shipp. Frtess Is Barred From
Ever Being New York Judge. N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 7. 1983. at B3. Concerning this incident. Professor Judith
Resnik commented that "[t]he open embrace of chance as determinative was fnghtening." Judith Resnik.
7iers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 841 (1984).
24. See supra notes 18-19, 23.
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quantum of luck available to a given team (e.g., rally caps). This, then, is the
first respect in which baseball is demonstrably superior to law. The rules of
baseball successfully acknowledge and incorporate the element of luck. The
rules of law foolishly seek to suppress it.
Consider next the element of skill. While the normative structure of
baseball acknowledges the importance of luck, it positively celebrates the skill
and expertise of the game's great practitioners. Skill is the most important
determinant of success in baseball, and the relative skills of various players are
constantly assessed and compared, both through the market for free agents and
through the statistical techniques for which the sport is famous. Indeed, many
baseball statistics specifically measure the interrelationship between individual
abilities and successful outcomes. A player knows not only how many hits he
has compiled, but how many of those hits resulted in runs being scored. A
pitcher knows how many "earned runs" he has given up, as well as how many
games he has "won" or "lost"--as if the other players on the team were
irrelevant. Finally, the rules of baseball recognize and readily assign blame to
individual players for "errors" they commit, and acknowledge that even the
best players occasionally make them.
The attitude of the legal system towards the skillfulness of its practitioners
is far more problematic. Granted, there is some recognition that the skills of
lawyers have an impact on case outcomes, as shown by the repeated calls for
"skills training" in law schools,25 and by the autobiographical claims of
celebrated attorneys, generally published long after the events in question,
detailing how they "won" various highly publicized cases. Interestingly, unlike
baseball, where only one pitcher receives credit for the "win" of any particular
game, in law it seems possible, indeed common, for many lawyers to take
credit for winning the same case. Sometimes, credit for the win may even be
claimed by lawyers on opposite sides.26
Judicial opinions, however, invariably decline to acknowledge that the skill
of the participants in a particular case had any significant impact on its
outcome. One never reads that "this case was very close but plaintiff's lawyer
pulled it out in the closing moments with a brilliant summation," nor that
"counsel for plaintiff had a number of chances to score significantly on cross-
examination, but failed to get the big hit." Judges still maintain the fiction that
results spring syllogistically from the application of unproblematic facts to a
25. See Edward J. Devitt & Helen P. Roland. Why Don't Law Schools Teach Law Students How To
Try Lawsuits?, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 445 (1987); see also Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of
Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?,
42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 231-33 (1973); Ronald L. Carlson, Competency and Professionalism in Modern
Litigation: The Role of the Law Schools, 23 GA. L. REV. 689 (1989); Robert H. Jackson. Training the Trial
Lawyer: A Neglected Area of Legal Education, 3 STAN. L. REV. 48, 57 (1950).
26. See, e.g., Larouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim by plaintiffs who obtained
stay and injunction pending appeal but lost on all grounds on appeal, and who nonetheless sought attorney
"fees as "prevailing party").
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preexisting body of law. Part of a lawyer's skill, therefore, is in concealing his
skillfulness, making the case look easy and the result self-evident.
By the same token, legal decisions, unlike baseball, rarely acknowledge the
role of lawyers' errors in contributing to the outcome of the contest. It is
extremely difficult for a losing litigant to obtain reversal on the grounds that
representation by counsel was inadequate. The relevant standard used to be that
the representation must have been so incompetent as to "shock the conscience"
of the court (and the average judicial conscience does not shock easily). While
most courts have now purported to adopt a slightly more lenient standard,27
the fact remains that a lawyer's mistakes, like a lawyer's skills, almost never
get proper credit in judicial decisions.
II. ROUNDING SECOND: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
OF BASEBALL RULES
We have seen that baseball is clearly superior to law in that it recognizes
the role played by luck and skill in producing results. But baseball, like law,
is also a system of rules. Like legal rules, baseball rules are in part self-
enforcing (i.e., players generally play by the rules) and in part subject to
adjudication by expert decisionmakers (i.e., umpires). It is in considering and
comparing the normative structures of baseball and law that American legal
scholars have made their distinctive contribution. The following two sections
describe the historical development of the branch of legal theory that attempts
to bring sophisticated legal analysis to the study of baseball. I am pleased to
note that up until now, this field has not been recognized as a separate area of
jurisprudential thought. Accordingly, I get to make up the name for it. After
studying the innovative nomenclature used by pioneers of other
interdisciplinary legal studies (e.g., law and economics, law and literature), I
have chosen to call this field "law and baseball."
Most of the early work in the field of law and baseball started with the
observation that the rules of baseball are less complex than the rules of law,
but only a little less complex. Thus, legal theorists studied the rules of baseball
in much the same way that neurologists study the nervous systems of worms,
or behavioral psychologists teach rats to run through mazes. In each of these
cases, researchers assume that their object of study is similar enough to their
real interests to yield useful insights, but a little bit simpler and therefore,
perhaps, a little bit easier to understand.
Thus, legal theorists studied the behavior of umpires in order to derive
important insights about the nature of the adjudicative process. Consider the
legendary discussion among three umpires as to the proper way to judge
27. See generally Project, Thirteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure Unired States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1982-1983, 72 GEO. LJ. 249. 529-36 (1983)
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whether pitches are balls or strikes. Says the first, "I call them as I see them."
The second counters, "I call them as they are." The third responds, "they ain't
nothing until I call them." Generations of American law students have
pondered the Zen-like asperity of this story.28 It does encapsulate, in three
lines, jurisprudential positions developed in other sources at far greater length,
but with no increase in clarity.
The extent to which baseball umpires have discretion in calling balls and
strikes and the degree to which they should exercise that discretion have been
debated by legal theorists almost as much as by baseball players. (Unlike
players, however, legal theorists generally do not risk being expelled from the
game for the vigorous expression of their views.)29
Improbably enough, the debate began with an Englishman, H.L.A. Hart,
who developed the famous "scorer's discretion" argument, designed to show
that even an unreviewed and unreviewable decisionmaker must score the game
in accordance with the rules. Hart argued that in order for the scorer of a game
to perform his role properly, he must award points in accordance with the
underlying rules of the game. If the scorer were to award points some other
way, Hart said, he would render the game incomprehensible, turning it into
some new game called "scorer's discretion."30 Hart never specified what
game he actually had in mind, but it appears to be something like soccer or
cricket, in which it is pretty easy to tell when a goal has been scored. 3t We
may wonder whether the course of jurisprudential theory would have been
changed if Hart had been a fan of, say, ice skating, in which the relation
between rules and scoring is far more problematic.
32
Nonetheless, Hart's argument attempts to show that judges must follow the
rules. But Hart allowed that when the rules are ambiguous, the law is
indeterminate and the unreviewed decisionmaker must make a "choice between
open alternatives. 33 One person who found this argument troubling was a
young American law professor named Ronald Dworkin. In responding to
Hart's argument, Dworkin argued that rules only partially govern many legal
determinations, and that "principles, policies, and other sorts of standards" also
28. One professor refers to the story as a "trope" of legal theory. Robert L. Birmingham, Teaching
Contracts: Coming Home To Roost, 69 B.U. L. REV. 435, 455 (1989) (reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON
CONTRACT (1986)); see also John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 60-62 (1993) (analyzing contemporary
positions on legal indeterminacy from perspective of ball/strike dichotomy).
29. But see Ruth Marcus, Clinton Withdraws Nomination of Guinier; Legal Writings Controversy
Dooms Choice, WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, at Al.
30. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139-42 (1961).
31. I have been informed, although I have been unable to verify, that Hart was an avid cricket fan.
If true, this casts considerable light on the scorer's discretion argument. Another way of stating Hart's point
is that if the scorer did not score the game in accordance with the rules, "it wouldn't be cricket."
32. See, e.g., George Vecsey, Skate Junkie Confesses: 'Axel? Lutz?', N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1994, § 8,
at I ("D[on't] ask me about the judging. I don't understand it. Don't ask me about the scoring. I hated math
when I was in school. Don't ask me about the jumps. I can't tell one from the other.").
33. HART, supra note 30, at 123-24.
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influence legal decisionmaking.' For Hart, law was the supreme rule-based
enterprise. He described law as constituted entirely by the interrelationship of
primary and secondary rules. For Dworkin, however, there was another
enterprise far more rule-bound and rule-dominated than law and that-you
guessed it-was baseball.
Dworkin's early work characterizes baseball as an enterprise dominated by
rules, and suggests that we take baseball rules as the model by which to judge
legal rules.35 This suggestion, of course, has recently been taken up by
Congress, which, at the urging of President Clinton and others, voted this
summer to apply the rule of "three strikes and you're out" to federal criminal
sentences.36 (By contrast, no one suggested that the length of the suspension
of George Steinbrenner should be determined by the federal sentencing
guidelines.)
37
Dworkin found that some rules of law fit the model of baseball rules quite
well (e.g., the statute of limitations for personal injury suits, "three years and
you're out"). Other legal rules, however, seemed both more fundamental and
more vague than the rules of baseball (e.g., the Erie doctrine, "three potentially
applicable inconsistent rules of law and you're extremely confused"). Dworkin
concluded that arguments based on vague and general principles are only
appropriate in complex enterprises like law." He couldn't imagine, for
example, a player arguing that he should be given four strikes on the general
principle that it would make the game more interesting. 9 In law, unlike
baseball, Dworkin claimed, such arguments from general principles arc made
all the time, and are often used to resolve real controversies.
Sometime after Dworkin first made this point, however, I suspect someone
told him about the infield fly rule.4 He may also have heard something about
various quirks in the rules governing interference and balls that hit the roofs
of domed stadiums. He may even have heard about the infamous "bonehead
34. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIoUsLY 22 (1978).
35. Id. at 24-25. ("This all-or-nothing is seen most plainly if we look at the way rules operate, not
in law, but in some enterprise they dominate-a game, for example. In baseball a rule provides that if the
batter has had three strikes, he is out.").
36. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Pub. L No 103.322. § 70001. 108
Stat. 1796, 1982.
37. But see Margaret A. Berger, Rethinking the Applicabilith of Evrdenarv Rules at Sentencing Of
Relevant Conduct and Hearsay and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule. 5 FED. SE.N'ENCING REP 96 (1992)
(arguing that federal evidentiary and sentencing rules create incentive for prosecutors to drop charges
similar to incentive fielders had, prior to adoption of infield fly rule. to drop fly balls)
38. DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 26-27.
39. Major league owners of yore were apparently a bit more creative. In 1887. they did raise the
number of strikes required for an out from three to four-presumably to make the game more interesting.
See Bruce Handy, The Power of Three. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24. 1994. § 6 (Magazine). at 108
40. For those not in the know, the infield fly rule is designed to keep infielders from deliberately
dropping fly balls when a player is on base in order to get a double play. It provides that. when an intielder
could catch a fly ball for an out with ordinary effort, the batter is out whether or not the infielder actually
catches the ball. On the rule's implications for law, see Berger. supra note 37. sources cited infra notes
52-54.
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Merkle" play.4 For whatever reason, in a later article Dworkin retreated from
his claim that games only involve rules, not principles. Switching from
baseball to chess,42 he argued that even the referee at a chess match may have
to decide hard cases by relying on an underlying principle, such as the
intellectual nature of the game, rather than simply by applying the rules.43
Clearly the same is true for a baseball umpire faced with a novel or unusual
event during a game. Thus, rather than emphasizing the contrast between the
rules of law and the rules of baseball, Dworkin set the stage for a new type of
scholarship that would emphasize their similarities.
Unfortunately, Dworkin seems to have stopped writing about baseball
altogether. In his recent work, he uses instead a new metaphor, comparing law
to a chain novel written chapter by chapter by authors who have no other
contact with each other." This obscure diversion seems likely to produce
fewer counterexamples to his theoretical construct. Nonetheless, the potential
indeterminacy of the rules of baseball continues to be a concern to the legal
and philosophical community, as demonstrated by, among others, Kent
Greenawalt's recent analysis of the metaphysical implications of the shrinking
strike zone.45
Ill. SAFE AT THIRD: THE DEVELOPMENT
OF LAW AND BASEBALL STUDIES
In the late 1970's and 1980's, radical movements appeared in the legal
academy that challenged some of the most fundamental distinctions in legal
41. A favorite source of baseball jurisprudence, the bonehead Merkle play took place in the bottom
of the ninth inning in a game between the New York Giants and the Chicago Cubs at the Polo Grounds.
The score was tied, and the Giants had Fred Merkle on first and another man on third. The next batter hit
safely and the man on third scored. The Cubs, however, claimed that Fred Merkle never touched second
base during the play and that Johnny Evers, the Cubs' second baseman, had later tagged second.
Unfortunately for the Cubs, the tag came only after Giants fans had begun pouring onto the field, and after
the ball had been touched by at least one New York player. Merkle, moreover, insisted that he had touched
second base on the way to the clubhouse. The umpire did not rule on the play prior to leaving the field.
He later conveyed his view through a sportswriter that the game had ended in a tie. To make matters more
confusing, a similar play had occurred a few weeks previously in a game between Chicago and Pittsburgh,
in which there was no question that the man on first had failed to tag second. Nonetheless, the run was
allowed. The umpire who made the call was the same one who disallowed the Giants' run in the bonehead
Merkle game. The President of the National League let both calls stand. See generally Clancy & Weiss,
supra note 10, at 421-24.
42. The article was first published in 1975, and may well have been written during or shortly after the
highly publicized world chess championship match between Bobby Fischer and Boris Spassky in 1972.
43. DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 102-04. Although part of the same book, many of the chapters in
Taking Rights Seriously were reprinted from earlier law review articles. Id. at xv.
44. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986). It might also be noted that the few modern
instances of chain writing cited by Dworkin or his commentators (soap operas, mystery novels, and soft-
core pornography) do not constitute particularly distinguished literary genres. See James Boyle, Legal
Fiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1013, 1016 (1987); Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any
Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. Rev. 513, 528 (1989).
45. Kent Greenawalt, How Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. REV. I, 25 (1990).
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thought.46 Radical scholars questioned the validity of the distinction between
"public" and "private," between "self' and "other," between "inside" and
"outside," between "up" and "down," and, not least, between "law" and
"baseball." They contended that the same reasoning and interpretive techniques
that applied to legal cases and controversies also applied to baseball games.
While some legal scholars were arguing that law could be found in all aspects
of human relationships, these scholars were arguing that it could be found in
the ballpark (where, not incidentally, they also serve beer).
In this, as in so many other areas of interdisciplinary legal studies, the
work of Professor Robert Cover blazed the trail. In his groundbreaking 1979
op-ed piece in The New York 7imes, titled Your Law-Baseball Quiz,47 Cover
explained that Oliver Wendell Holmes held a status in law similar to that of
Casey Stengel in baseball, because both "had enormously varied and long
careers" and "each achieved immortality for his use of the English language."
Byron White, Cover felt, resembled Jackie Jensen, because "both were better
as running backs."
Serious work comparing Supreme Court Justices and baseball players has
continued apace. In 1983, Professor David Currie of the University of Chicago
Law School sought to identify the least important Justice in Supreme Court
history.4 His explanation for this endeavor makes it clear that he is a true
follower of Robert Cover. As Currie notes:
I acknowledge at the outset the highly subjective nature of the
inquiry. Insignificance, as every Chicago Cub supporter knows, is in
the eye of the beholder. Yet every baseball town has its particular
favorites: the shortstop who regularly threw the ball into the lower
grandstand; the pitcher who habitually walked batters when the bases
were loaded; the slugger who struck out whenever he came up with
men on base. In hopes of identifying individuals of comparable stature
in the judicial field, I have devised a set of Objective Indicators of
Insignificance ("OI1') .... 49
Very recently, comparisons between baseball and Supreme Court judging
became an issue of practical concern when it was widely speculated that
Senator George Mitchell had withdrawn his name from consideration for a
Supreme Court seat in order to remain eligible for the job of commissioner of
46. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamnorphoses of the Legal Distinction,
40 STAN. L. REv. 929 (1988); David L. Shapiro, The Deati ofthe Up-Down Distinction. 36 STAN. L REv.
465 (1984).
47. Robert M. Cover, Your Law-Baseball Quiz. N.Y. TimES. Apr. 5. 1979. at A23.
48. David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry. 50 U. CII. L. REv. 466
(1983).
49. Id. at 466. Incidentally, Currie's article itself deserves recognition for its unique acknowledgments
footnote, which reads, "I should like to thank none of my colleagues for help in composing this seminal
article. None of them appeared to take it seriously." Id. at 466 n.t. I must say that I can sympathize with
Professor Currie's difficulties.
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major league baseball.5" It is not difficult to understand why Mitchell might
have made such a choice. In many ways, the job of baseball commissioner is
a cushier position than that of Supreme Court Justice. The pay is better and the
off-season is longer. (The seats, however, are better on the Court.)
On the whole, though, Mitchell's choice points out how similar the two
jobs really are. Both Supreme Court Justices and baseball commissioners serve
as guardians of an important part of American culture and tradition. Both jobs
confer great decisionmaking responsibility but no independent power of
enforcement. The real difference, it seems to me, is that a successful baseball
commissioner must achieve peaceful and harmonious working relations among
twenty-eight owners and more than six hundred players. A successful Justice,
on the other hand, must create a peaceful and harmonious consensus of opinion
between Clarence Thomas and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. It is unclear whether
Senator Mitchell sought the greater or the lesser challenge.
5 1
While Cover and Currie investigated the parallel lives of Supreme Court
Justices and baseball players, others probed the foundations of baseball
jurisprudence itself. The legendary essay, Aside: The Common Law Origins of
the Infield Fly Rule,52 appeared in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
in 1975. A steady stream of law review articles followed, with titles like
Further Aside: A Comment on "The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly
Rule ", 5 The Infield Fly Rule and the Internal Revenue Code: An Even
Further Aside,54 Strict Constructionism and the Strike Zone,55 and In re
Brett: The Sticky Problem of Statutory Construction.56 These articles
demonstrate what happens when finely honed skills of legal analysis and
statutory interpretation are applied at extended and sometimes excruciating
length to trivial or fanciful questions that have no effect on the real world. In
short, these pieces are just like regular law review articles, only funnier.
5 7
No discussion of baseball's contribution to contemporary American legal
thought would be complete without some consideration of the strange
jurisprudential career of Dennis Martinez. Martinez, a better-than-average
50. See Richard Justice, Baseball Has Eye on Mitchell; Seen as Front-Runner for Commissioner,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 13, 1994, at B I; Larry Whiteside, Mitchell Must Wait for Baseball Post, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 14, 1994, at 43.
51. Mitchell himself has expressed a view on this subject. When the Senate majority leader was
warned that as baseball commissioner he would have to deal with 28 big egos, he reportedly replied, "For
me, that's a 72 percent reduction." Bob Curran, Find the Missing Hockey Fans, BUFFALO NEWS, May II,
1994, at 15.
52. Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1474 (1975).
53. John J. Flynn, Further Aside: A Comment on "The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule",
4 J. CONTEMP. L. 241 (1978).
54. Mark W. Cochran, The Infield Fly Rule and the Internal Revenue Code: An Even Further Aside,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567 (1988).
55. Douglas 0. Linder, Strict Constructionism and the Strike Zone, 56 UMKC L. REV. 117 (1987).
56. Finkelstein, supra note 10.
57. See also Donald A. Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, From "Shoeless" Joe Jackson to Ivan Boesky:
A Sporting Response to Law and Economics Criticism of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 81 KY. L.J.
295 (1993) (not as funny as the other articles, but, then again, it deals with law and economics).
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pitcher then playing for the Baltimore Orioles, was engaged in some fairly
standard pregame colloquy with Ira Berkow, a sports columnist for The New
York Tines. Berkow had just seen Martinez talking to his manager, Earl
Weaver, and asked Martinez to recount the conversation. Martinez replied that
the manager had told him to "throw strikes and keep 'em off the bases."
Martinez further commented, "[w]hat more could he say?"58 Unbeknownst to
Martinez, his remarks subsequently were to be noted by Stanley Fish, an
eminent legal and literary theorist, who detected in them the aspect of
genius.
5 9
Now it must be pointed out that baseball has had more than its share of
great literary figures, most of whom worked in the oral tradition. Nonetheless,
the sayings of such men as Casey Stengel, Satchel Paige, Phil Rizzuto, and
Yogi Berra are widely quoted and remembered, and have even found their way
into more than a few judicial opinions. A recent LEXIS search found thirty
citations to the wit and wisdom of Berra. The phrase most commonly
attributed to him, "it's ddja vu all over again," appears particularly helpful to
courts with respect to issues such as stare decisis and res judicata."u
When considered against these masters of the baseball koan, "throw strikes
and keep 'em off the bases" seems pretty weak tea indeed. But that, of course,
was Fish's point. Fish, as a good postmodern literary theorist, had abandoned
the canon of classical baseball literary tradition. Like other postmodern critics,
he offered us the banal and pedestrian remark as an equivalent to the clever
and witty one. He applauded Martinez precisely because Martinez had nothing
interesting to say about what he did. The only interesting thing was that he did
it.
Fish found this professional taciturnity important because it allowed him
to argue that lawyers, like baseball players, have nothing interesting to say
about what they do, and therefore, like Dennis Martinez, they should just shut
up and do it.6' Like the law and baseball radicals, Fish believed that law and
baseball are basically the same game; lawyers just talk about it too much.
Of course, Fish's hope that he could get lawyers to shut up by publishing
a twenty-seven-page article in The Yale Law Journal never was very realistic.
58. Ira Berkow, The Old and New Manager. N.Y. TIMi-s. June 26. 1985. at B13
59. See Stanley Fish. Dennis Martinez and the Uses of 77eor-. 96 YAI- LJ 1773 (1987)
60. See, e.g., Key v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 1991): see also National Rifle Ass'n
Federal Election Comm'n, 854 F.2d 1330. 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1988): United States % Mant. 810 F2d 80,
81 (6th Cir. 1987); Davis v. Coopers & Lybrand. 787 F Supp 787. 804 n41 (ND II1 1992). Clausxsn
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 754 F. Supp. 1576. 1577 (S.D. Ga. 1990); United States % Dasenport. 740
F. Supp. 1371, 1372 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Parsons v. Parsons. 490 N.V2d 733. 739 (S D 1992) (Sabcrs. J.
dissenting).
61. Interestingly, in the column that started the whole business. Ira Berkow disagreed with the
Martinez (and Fish) position that Weaver had said all that could be said on the matter After recounting
the conversation, he commented that "'Weaver didn't say quite enough, apparently The Yankees beat the
Orioles, 5-4. But there were still nearly 100 games left and Weaver. surely. will think of other things to
say." Berkow, supra note 58, at B I3.
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His article engendered more articles, and more talk, by yet more lawyers. (To
my knowledge, no baseball players have yet responded.) Some of this response
was about law or legal theory, but a substantial amount was about baseball. In
order to refute Fish, lawyers analyzed baseball talk, 62 and baseball books and
baseball movies, 63 and Ted Williams' swing," and why Orel Hershiser is
a better pitcher than Dennis Martinez.65 Indeed, the most significant thing
about this affair is the way that Fish's invocation of some fairly ordinary
baseball dialogue sparked a massive debate among legal theorists. It is hard to
imagine that Fish would have gotten the same response if he had started with,
say, a quote from Justice Cardozo.
The lessons from the Martinez-Fish enterprise seem to me to be twofold:
first, that baseball is simply more interesting than law, and second, that it is
impossible to get lawyers to shut up about either subject.
IV. THROWN OUT AT HOME: CRITIQUES
OF LAW-BASEBALL SCHOLARSHIP
We have seen, therefore, how the development of law and baseball
scholarship has revealed insights that, if not superior to those of prior legal
scholars, are at least different. But law and baseball scholarship itself is not
immune from critique. Before I close this Essay, I feel I must say something
both about potential feminist challenges to law and baseball studies and about
the insidious dangers of game theory.
The fact that few women have achieved positions of power or prominence
in the field of baseball may lead to some resistance to the law and baseball
movement.66 While a flip answer might be that, until a very few years ago,
the same observation could have been made about law, it seems to me that the
feminist challenge goes deeper than that.
There are, in fact, two major strands of contemporary feminist thought,
each of which has important implications for law and baseball scholarship.
Those who are inclined to the "other voice" approach seek to discover the
female aspects of institutions that, in a male-dominated world, have been
62. See Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GUO. L.J. 37,
53-54 (1987) (suggesting pitching advice that Wittgenstein, Hegel, and Kant might have given to Dennis
Martinez).
63. See Brook Thomas, Stanley Fish and the Uses of Baseball: The Return of the Natural, 2 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 59 (1990); Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639
(1990).
64. See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 871, 916 (1989) (suggesting that it is worth imitating).
65. See Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 802 (1989) (noting
that Hershiser pays more attention to baseball "theory").
66. There are some notable exceptions in the sport's management, including the late Jean Yawkey,
the much-beloved owner of the Boston Red Sox, and Marge Schott, the somewhat less-beloved owner of
the Cincinnati Reds. For the contribution of women players on the field at a moment of national crisis, see
A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN (Columbia Pictures 1992).
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suppressed and driven underground. Such scholars could make much of the
fact that baseball, as its historians now generally recognize, was not invented
by Abner Doubleday, but rather is the outgrowth of the British game of
"rounders, ' a game that, at least in modern-day Britain, is played primarily
by schoolgirls.68 It is also worth noting that the first known literary reference
to "base-ball" appears in Jane Austen's novel Northanger Abbey, in reference
to a fifteen-year-old girl who prefers cricket and baseball to reading books."
These little-known facts strongly suggest that the time is overdue for an
account of baseball that looks beyond its masculinist obsession with winning
and domination and its objectifying emphasis on statistics, and discovers
instead its hidden feminist face.
I myself, however, am inclined to the more radical feminist approach. The
notion that baseball is inherently a male game is itself a product of socially
constructed masculinist thinking, and not a reflection of innate physical ability.
Indeed, although many may view this as an extreme position, I would maintain
that women, with the proper experience and training, can be equal, and perhaps
even superior, to men in their ability to sit on the couch, drink beer, and make
wisecracks about the game. Moreover, for those concerned with breaking down
hegemonic constructs in the legal academy, law and baseball scholarship offers
the advantage that there has been virtually no participation in it by dead white
European males.
But there is a specter haunting law-baseball scholarship, a new
interdisciplinary approach that threatens to replace the playful analogizing of
the law-baseball aficionados with the soulless rigidity of mathematical analysis.
I am talking about game theory. Now I will concede that game theory can
provide important heuristics for analyzing certain types of legal problems, and
that it is often superior to the economic models it replaces. It would be
extremely unfortunate, however, for all comparisons of legal rules and baseball
rules to be subsumed under the formal strictures of game theoretic analysis.
It's not the mathematical approach that is objectionable. Everyone knows
that baseball fans love math (or at least statistics, which look like math to
everyone but mathematicians). The beauty of statistical analysis in baseball,
however, is that you can use it to prove anything you want. Through careful
use of the appropriate stats, unknown players can be shown to have performed
extraordinary feats, and great players can be shown to have been merely
average. Because all these positions are supportable, every one of them is open
67. See. e.g.. Fox Butterfield, Cooperstown? Hoboken' TrY New York Caty. N Y TI.IE.S. Oct. 4. 1990.
at Al.
68. See Googlies Make Way For Bloopers. THE HERALD (Glasgow). June 30. 1993. at 12, Cohn F
Harris, A Real. World Sport, OTTAWA CmzEN. Nov. 7. 1992. at G6; Ken Lawrence. BBC Pitching for
Baseball, THE TIMES (London). Dec. 21, 1991. at 28; Ben Wright & Jason Steger. Sniff Of Scandal Htts
Super-Rich Sluggers, FINANCIAL TIMES (London). May 9. 1987. at 17.
69. JANE AUSTEN, NORTHANGER ABBEY 13 (John Davie ed.. Oxford University Press 1971) (1848),
see also I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 979 (2d ed. 1989).
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to (endless) debate. Game theory, in contrast, seeks to determine "dominant
strategies" leading to stable equilibria and therefore predictable outcomes. I
leave it to the reader to decide which mathematical approach provides greater
insight into the legal process (or baseball).
Moreover, the basic purpose of baseball statistics is to reanalyze and shed
new light on games that have already been played. The basic purpose of game
theory is to invent new games that are analytically precise, have determinate
outcomes, and are no fun to play. This, of course, is baseball's big advantage.
It is hard to imagine anyone, even a law and economics professor, sitting down
in front of the TV with a beer to watch a close game of "prisoner's dilemma."
Law-baseball scholarship, on the other hand, empowers those law students (and
professors) who wish to defer studying and other legal drudgery by giving
them an excuse to watch the World Series. It's not the only form of legal
research that causes you to work late nights and weekends. But it may be the
only one that gives you reason to cheer while you're doing it.
